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1. INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 1995, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia entered a final judgment against the Microsoft
Corporation' for violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
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' See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A.94-1564, 1995 WL
505998, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995). Microsoft Corporation, "the world's
leading maker of software for [IBM-compatible Personal Computers ("PCs")],
holds about 80 percent of the global market for PC operating systems, the
programs that provide the crucial first level of interface between man and
machine." David Mok, New Windows 95 A Window of Opportunity for PC
World, Bus. TIMES, July 1, 1995, at 6. In the computer industry, "once a
breakthrough software package sweeps the market, it often proves extraordi-
narily difficult to displace." MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW S 3.8.8, at 25 (Supp. 1995). Antitrust inves-
tigations of Microsoft initially concerned exclusionary conduct by the company
which allegedly gave rise to "nonfunctional incompatibilities between
[Microsoft's] own and [its] competitors' operating system software." Id. S 3.8.8,
at 26 n.49.
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Antitrust Act of 1890 ("Sherman Act").2 Following an unusual
investigation by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice ("Antitrust
Division"),3 and an equally intricate procedural history,4 the
district court enjoined Microsoft's use of per processor licenses,5
license agreements that exceeded one year in length,6 and restric-
tive nondisclosure agreements for a period of seventy-eight
2 See 15 U.S.C. % 1, 2 (1994). See also infra Section 2.1.1. (providing text
and discussion of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).
I In 1990, the FTC began investigating Microsoft's alleged anticompetitive
conduct, but ended its inquiry in 1993 when the commissioners could not agree
to commence an administrative proceeding. See United States v. Microsoft
Co 159 F.R.D. 318, 321 (D.D.C. 1995) [hereinafter Microsoft 1]. Then, in a
highy unusual maneuver, the Antitrust Division initiated its own probe of the
company. See FTC Closes Antitrust Probe of Microsoft; Antitrust Division Begins
Its Own Probe, 65 Antitrust & Trade Re. Rep. (BNA) No. 1629, at 288 (Aug.
26, 1993) ("While the FTC, on rare occasions, has looked at investigations that
were closed by the [Antitrust] Division, the reverse situation is thought to be
even more unusual.").
4 Judge Stanley Sporkin wrote the initial district court opinion. See
Microsoft 1, 159 F.R.D. at 321. He refused to enforce a consent decree
negotiated between the Antitrust Division and Microsoft to restrict the length
and nature of Microsoft's licensing contracts, claiming that the agreement was
not in the "public interest" under the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp. 1994),
which establishes a system for procedural and substantive review op-consent
decrees. See 159 F.R.D. at 338. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
bothered by Judge Sporkin's apparent bias against Microsoft and his misapplica-
tion of the Tunney Act, reversed and remanded for rehearing by a different
district court judge. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463-
65 (D.C. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Microsoft 11]. On remand, Judge Thomas
Jackson presided. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A.94-1564,
1995 WL 505998, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Microsoft JI1].
' See Microsoft 111, 1995 WL 505998, at '13, *7. Under a per processor
license, computer equipment manufacturers pay Microsoft royalties for each
PC sold regardless of w-hether a Microsoft operating system is included in that
PC." Microsoft 1, 159 F.R.D. at 323. "Microsoft has used its monopoly power,
in effect, to levy a 'tax' on PC manufacturers who would otherwise like to
offer an alternative system," thereby restricting competition, innovation, and
consumer choice. Court Enters Consent Decree to Resolve 1994 Charges Against
Microsoft's Practices, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1727, at 268
(Aug. 24, 1995) [hereinafter Consent Decree] (quoting Assistant Attorney
General of the Antitrust Division Anne K. Bingaman).
' See Microsoft III, 1995 WL 505998, at *2, '7. The U.S. Department of
Justice claimed that contracts with equipment manufacturers that lasted "for an
excessive period" effectively precluded new market entrants from establishing
themselves in the operating systems market. Consent Decree, supra note 5, at
268.
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months.7
Nonetheless, the domestic implications of the U.S.
government's relentless pursuit of computer software giant Bill
Gates,' Microsoft's chief executive and founder, are perhaps less
intriguing than the international ramifications. Pursuant to an
executive agreement with the United States, the European Union
("EU") agreed to treat the August 1995 consent decree as its own
operative law, historically marking the first coordinated effort
between the United States and the EU in initiating and resolving
an antitrust enforcement action
The cooperative venture began shortly after Novell,
Microsoft's chief competitor in the applications software market,
filed a complaint on June 30, 1993 with the competition division
of the EU's policy enforcement body, the European Commission,
alleging violations by Microsoft under the Treaty of Rome's
primary antitrust provisions, articles 85 and 86.10 While Novell
was soliciting aid from the European Commission, the United
States' Assistant Attorney General ("AAG") of the Antitrust
Division, Anne K. Bingaman, recovered the U.S. investigation of
Microsoft from the FTC." Microsoft agreed to negotiate an
' See Microsoft III, 1995 WL 505998, at *3, *7; see also Microsoft Settles
Accusations of Monopolistic Selling Practices, 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1673, at 106 (July 21, 1994) [hereinafter Microsoft Settles] (discussing
the court's injunction of Microsoft's use of nondisclosure agreements).
Microsoft's alleged use of restrictive nondisclosure agreements with independent
software developers prevented the developers from designing applications
software for other competing operating systems. See Consent Decree, supra note
5, at 268.
S Microsoft's ubiquity in the domestic press provides circumstantial
evidence of its dominance in the U.S. software market. For example, in 1995
The Wall Street Journal mentioned Microsoft in 1,033 articles and Bill Gates in
149. See The Business Press: Bill Who?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, 5 3, at 2.
The New York Times published 868 articles mentioning Microsoft and 168 refer-
ring to Gates. See id.
I See Microsoft I, 159 F.R.D. at 322 n.6; Microsoft Settles, supra note 7, at
106.
10 See Microsoft Settles, supra note 7, at 106; Louise Kehoe & Geof
Wheelwright, EC to Probe Antitrust Allegations Against Microsoft, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 22. Novell raised similar issues of Microsoft's alleged attempts
to limit competition by drafting per processor agreements and by "'tying' .. .
sales of one product to another." Id. Each company accused the other of bad
faith negotiations in the merger discussions which arose out of an unsuccessful
bid by Microsoft to acquire Novell. See id.
" See Microsoft I, 159 F.R.D. at 323-24. For a discussion of the unique
transfer of the investigation from the FTC to the Antitrust Division, see supra
19961
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identical "undertaking" with the European Commission 2 and
consent decree with the Justice Department ("DOJ")13 in order
to resolve the allegations of anticompetitive activity.14
The dual enforcement that arose out of the Microsoft
investigation was the product of a 1991 competition Agreement
between the DOJ, the FTC, and the European Commission."
The Agreement's stated purpose was "to promote cooperation and
coordination and [to] lessen the possibility or impact of differences
between the Parties in the application of their antitrust laws."16
The international community's positive response to this Agree-
ment, as demonstrated by the Microsoft incident," was not
surprising in light of a recent trend of nations forming bilateral
competition agreements to align competition policies in the
note 3.
12 Although an "undertaking" lacks a concrete definition, in the context
of Articles 85 and 86 it symbolizes the point after which the European
Commission may formally respond to, or regulate conduct in, an antitrust
proceeding. See Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Undertakings in E. C. Competition Law,
in PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT IN E.C. AND U.S. COMPETITION LAW 90,
93-94, 99 (Piet Jan Slot & Alison McDonnell eds., 1993) [hereinafter PROCE-
DURE AND ENFORCEMENT].
13 A consent decree is a "judicial order entered by [a] court with the
consent of the [Antitrust] Division and the party or parties against whom the
case was filed, upon a finding by the court that entry of the decree is in the
public interest." Thomas E. Kauper, The Use of Consent Decrees in American
Antitrust Cases, in PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 104.
The decree is neither an admission of guilt by the defendant nor a judicial
determination that antitrust laws have been violated. See id. at 105.
1 See Microsoft Settles, supra note 7, at 106. In the Microsoft scenario, "the
undertaking became effective in the [European Union] the moment it wassigned on July 15, [1994]." Id. at 107. Ironically, the decree was not enforced
formally in the United States, where it originated, until Judge Jackson delivered
his final judgment on August 21, 1995. See Microsoft III, 1995 WL 505998, at
*1.
15 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the
Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., 30 I.L.M.
1491 [hereinafter Agreement]. Since 1993, the entity formerly referred to as the
European Community ("EC") has been known as the European Union ("EU").
Although the Agreement was originally signed in 1991, this Comment generally
refers to the EU and speaks of the EC only where necessary for Iiistorical
accuracy.
16 Id. art. I, at 1492.
17 See Bingaman Briefs Seminar on International Fronts, 67 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1687, at 543 (Nov. 3, 1994) [hereinafter Bingaman
Briefs]; Microsft Settles, supra note 7, at 107.
[Vol. 17:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss3/5
ANTITRUST DIALOGUE
international market."8 Despite this support, the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") invalidated the pact in the 1994 decision
French Republic v. Commission, finding it procedurally void
because the European Commission lacked the authority to sign a
treaty "intended to produce legal effects" in the international arena
without the formal approval of the European Council of Minis-
ters.
19
Although the ECJ vacated the Agreement strictly on procedur-
al grounds without implicating competition law, one might
speculate as to how the Court would respond to the Agreement's
substantive terms. Specifically, the Agreement contains two provi-
sions concerning the point in time when comity considerations
authorize a nation's jurisdiction over conduct occurring beyond
the nation's territory, a legal concept known as extraterritoriality.
Extraterritoriality pertains to the operation of laws "upon
persons, rights, or jural relations, existing beyond the limits of the
enacting state or nation, but still amenable to its laws."2' The
"problem of 'extraterritorial jurisdiction"' arises when nations
advance conflicting claims in an attempt to apply their own
policies and laws "to regulate extraterritorial conduct 'in a way
which may undermine and conflict with the laws and policies of
a foreign government.' 21 This problem confronts many spheres
of public international law, and is not confined solely to competi-
tion law.2
1 See, e.g., Joseph P. Griffin, EC and U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and
Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 353, 374 (1994) (discussing this
Agreement's natural evolution from U.S. bilateral agreements with Australia,
Canada, and Germany). In the first two years following this Agreement, the
United States sent approximately 60 notifications to the EU, compared to four
sent the year before signing. See id. at 375. Likewise, the EU sent approxi-
mately 40 notifications to the United States during the first two years,
compared to two the year before its signing. See id.
19 Case 327/91, French Republic v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 3641, 3662.
20 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990).
21 Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The
United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 5
(1992) [hereinafter Alford, Application] (citation omitted).
2 See, e.g., Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial
Application of United States Law and the Protection of Human Rights: Holding
Multinational Corporations to Domestic and International Standards, 10 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.. 123 (1996) (discussing problems associated with the
inconsistent extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws to U.S. multinational
corporations). One commentator identifies the U.S. law extending federal court
jurisdiction to crimes against U.S. vehicles in outer space as another illustration
1996]
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In the competition realm, as well as in other areas of public
international law, extraterritoriality determinations are often
grounded in considerations of comity, "a willingness to grant a
privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good
will."' The Agreement codifies the traditional U.S. concept of
negative comity, in which Nation A extends its laws to a foreign
defendant whose conduct is affecting Nation A's market, subse-
quent to a balance between its own interest in protecting its
markets and the interests of the foreign defendant. 4  The
conduct need not occur within Nation A's physical boundaries.'
The Agreement also sets forth a positive comity provision,
whereby Nation B complies with Nation A's affirmative request
to prevent anticompetitive conduct within A's borders."'
The European Commission has increasingly adopted the U.S.
antitrust tenet of extraterritoriality, albeit in a limited form, and
applied its laws to foreign defendants whose conduct affects
commerce in the EU? By contrast, the ECJ remains beholden
to the traditional EU policies of strict territoriality and furthering
Union integration when reviewing European Commission
decisions. 28 In effect, then, the ECJ extends its jurisdiction to
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. See JAMEs R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 147 (1992) [hereinafter Fox, DICTIONARY]
(referring to 18 U.S.C. 5 7).
23 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). The U.S. Supreme
Court has defined comity as "the recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation."
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
24 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The International Dimension of Competition
Policy, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 833, 836 (1994); see also Alford, Application,
supra note 21, at 48 (noting that each party shall take into account the interests
ot the other party when enforcing the Agreement).
21 See Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 834.
26 See id. at 836. See also Alford, Application, supra note 21, at 47; Eleanor
M. Fox, Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property-TRIPS and its Antitrust
Counterparts, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481, 486 (1996) [hereinafter Fox,
TRIPS] (acknowledging that the positive comity provision in the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") first appeared
in the U.S.-E.C. Agreement). Although "[i]ncorporation of positive comity
into multilateral instruments is a wise and important step ... it does not
establish or seek to establish antitrust rules." Id.
21 See Alford, Application, supra note 21, at 28-30.
28 See id. at 31-37 (discussing the ECJ's dedication to an "objective
territoriality principle" which requires that a foreign defendant engage in a
"consummating act" on EU territory in order to extend jurisdiction); Griffin,
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foreign defendants only when the defendant's conduct occurs on
EU territory and necessarily threatens the unity among Member
States.
On April 10, 1995, the Agreement was reinstated upon the
requisite approval by the Council of Ministers and with the intent
that it shall apply from September 23, 1991, the original date of
enactment.29 However, because comity of nations involves "acts
or practices of nations based on good will and mutuality, rather
than strict application and enforcement of rules of law,"3" this
Comment recognizes that the disparate theories of competition
held by the European Commission and the ECJ create potential
obstacles to vigorous enforcement of the Agreement's provisions
within the EU. The Microsoft episode serves as an illustration of
how this bilateral Agreement can operate as a valuable step
towards convergence of competition policies in today's global
economy. One expert on trade policy has recognized that "unless
and until the United States and other industrialized nations
concede their sovereignty over important economic policy issues,
any process of achieving harmonization will be evolutionary at
best."31 Favoring the policies embodied in the Agreement's
positive and negative comity provisions, this Comment traces the
evolution of dissent between the Commission and the ECJ,
discusses the problems posed by their ideological divide, and
suggests how the ECJ might approach the Agreement's terms so
it will decide future "hard cases" in accordance with the policies
of the United States and the Commission.
In Section 2, this Comment contrasts the antitrust 32 legisla-
supra note 18, at 378-79.
29 See Decision of the Council and the Commission of 10 April 1995
Concerning the Conclusion of the Agreement of the United States of America
Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, 1995 OJ. (L 95) 45
[hereinafier Decision of 10 April 1995].
30 Fox, DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 77.
31 Michael L. Weiner, Developments at the Division, in the Court, and in
Congress. The Increasing Internationalization ofAntitrust, ANTITRUST, Fall 1993,
at 31, 33.
31 Although antitrust law encompasses both competition and trade, this
Comment restricts its analysis to the former. For the view that competition
can no longer enjoy a separate existence from trade, see Eleanor M. Fox,
Competition Law and the A genda for the WYO. Forging the Links of Competition
and Trade, 4 PAC. Rim L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fox, Agenda for the
WTO].
1996]
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tion and case law of the United States with that of the EU,
discussing each body's historical relationship with extraterritoriali-
ty. While the antitrust enforcement bodies and the courts in the
United States share a uniform understanding of extraterritoriality,
the European Commission and the ECJ do not enjoy such
symmetry. Section 3 summarizes the substantive provisions and
procedural flaws of the bilateral administrative Agreement that
attempted to synchronize U.S. and EU antitrust policies. In
Section 4, this Comment argues that different conceptions of
extraterritoriality have contributed to the chasm between the
European Commission and the ECJ, which in turn, threatens the
future potency of the reenacted Agreement in ECJ decisions.
Section 5 first considers and then rejects a global International
Antitrust Code Working Group proposal as a sufficient alternative
to such bilateral agreements and ultimately advocates vigorous
enforcement of the reenacted Agreement. Section 5 concludes
with suggestions for future implementation that will promote the
Agreement's survival before the ECJ, endorsing an increased
emphasis on discourse as a vehicle for mutual comprehension of
comity principles. The accumulation of bilateral agreements,
applied where the factions have mutual interests, will facilitate the
long term goal of global convergence of policies, and may
eventually translate into convergent legislation.
2. COMPARATIVE ANTITRUST
Although the United States and the EU33 each serve as the
" In 1951, the Treaty of Paris gave rise to the first vestige of a European
community, the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"). See TREATY
INSTITUTING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC
TREATY]. In 1957, two additional communities evolved: the European Atomic
Energy Community ("EURATOM"), see TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY], and the
European Economic Community, see TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
EcoNoMIc CoMMuNITY [EEC TREATY].
The Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community with
the primary goal of eradicating most, if not all, economic barriers between the
six origin Member States of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands. See EEC TREATY; CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE CCH
GUIDE TO 1993 CHANGES IN EEC LAW 102 (2d ed. 1990). In 1993, the
Treaty of Rome was officially renamed the "Treaty Establishing the European
Community," and "Economic" was eliminated from the entity's formal title,
signifying the EC's new and broader political, social, and policy-oriented
functions. See RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A NUTSHELL
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other's predominant trading partner, they did not sign their first
antitrust agreement until September 1991." This delay in adopt-
ing an agreement is even more surprising considering both entities
have entered bilateral competition-based agreements with other
nations.35
The divergent goals and expectations of each party offer one
possible explanation for the delay in drafting a convergence
agreement. Past antitrust initiatives of the EU have often
implemented substantive competition rules or enforcement
procedures "to ensure that trade between the [EU] and [other]
countries is not distorted by anti-competitive practices."36 In
contrast, the United States has entered bilateral agreements "not
to facilitate trade[,] but mainly to deal with an aspect . .. rather
peculiar to U.S. antitrust law, i.e. extraterritoriality." 37  Dispari-
ties between each entity's legislation and case law help explain the
8 (2d ed. 1995). At the same time, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
(TEU") added non-economic provisions to the Treaty of Rome. See id.
The ECSC, EURATOM, and the EC collectively represent the European
Union under the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. See EEC TREATY.
As of January 1, 1995, the EU consisted of 15 Member States, with several
Eastern European and Mediterranean countries having applied for membership.
See FOLSOM, supra, at 32-33. Some experts contrast the U.S. principle of a
"melting pot" with the EU emphasis on "the diversity of nation-states." Joel
Havemann, One Europe-The Dream of Unity, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at 1
(quoting Peter Ludlow, Director of the Center for European Studies in
Brussels .
14 See Auke Haagsma, International Competition Policy Issues: The E.C.-U.S.
Agreement of September 23, 1991, in PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra
note 12, at 229.
35 See id. at 229. The EU has signed competition-related agreements with
many countries including Cyprus, Israel, and Canada. See id. at 229-30 & n.3.
The United States has signed bilateral agreements exclusively focused on
competition practices with Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
Australia. See id. at 230 & nn.4-6. Similarly, the United States has employed
a mutual legal assistance treaty ("MLAT") with Canada to jointly prosecute
international cartels that have violated antitrust laws. See Bingaman Briefs,
supra note 17, at 543. The 1993 Pacific Institution project, however, has
experienced similar difficulties in its efforts to apply U.S. antitrust laws to the
Japanese market. See generally UNILATERAL APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST AND
TRADE LAWS: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN (Henry B. Cortesi ed. 1994) [hereinafter
UNILATERAL APPLICATION] (presenting forum discussions held in Washington,
D.C. and Tokyo and a series of position papers analyzing convergence between
the United States and Japan).
36 Haagsma, supra note 34, at 230.
37 Id.
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
difficulties surrounding competition convergence.
2.1. Case Law Reinforcing Legislative Extraterritoriality in the
United States
The classic model of U.S. antitrust jurisprudence permits
unilateral," extraterritorial enforcement of sanctions on anti-
competitive behavior affecting U.S. commerce.39  Literally
applied, violators under the classic model need not be U.S.
citizens.4 Although the model's origin has been explained by
historical and geopsychological factors,4' extraterritoriality's
endurance as a prominent theme of U.S. antitrust jurisprudence
draws from the legislative text and the relevant case law.
2.1.1. The Legislative Birth of Comity
In the United States, antitrust policy has been shaped largely
by a triad of early legislation.42 The Sherman Act,43 the Clay-
38 "Unilateral" is defined as "[o]ne-sided;... having relation to only one
of two or more persons or things." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1531 (6th ed.
1990).
3 See The Antitrust Practice Group, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan,
Convergence of Trade Laws and Antitrust Laws: Unilateral, Extraterritorial U.S.
Antitrust En/brcement-Can It Work to Open Japan's Markets? [hereinafter
Stroock], in UNILATERAL APPLICATION, supra note 35, at 113, 114.
40 See id.
41 James Friedberg, Professor of Law at West Virginia University, argues
that geopsychological factors in the United States have socialized the population
.with a sense of a continental government ... that, while limited in its
substantive power by constitutional federalism, is not limited by international
geography in its jurisdictional reach." James J. Friedberg, The Convergence of
Law in an Era of Political Integration: The Wood Pulp Case and the Alcoa Effects
Doctrine, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 289, 297 (1991).
42 These three pieces of legislation illustrate the origin of extraterritoriality
in competition policy. This limited discussion does not negate the importance
of other legislation affecting competition in the United States. Of particular
significance is the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. % 8-11 (1994), which prohibits
importers from engaging in conspiracies, trusts, agreements, or contracts that
restrain trade or increase import market prices. See id. S 8. Also relevant is the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. % 41-58 (1994), which grants the
FTC the authority to act against "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." Id. 5 45(a)(1). Both of these statutes are explicitly named in the
1991 Agreement. See Agreement, supra note 15, art. I, 5 2(a)(ii), at 1492.
Other relevant legislation includes Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. 5 18a (1994), which equips the
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ton Act of 1912 ("Clayton Act"),44 and the Robinson-Patman Act
of 1936 ("Robinson-Patman Act")45 each had an impact on both
local and foreign businesses. The Sherman Act responded to "the
great social and economic dislocations caused by the industrial
revolution" and reflected early misgivings towards big business.
46
The Sherman Act imposes criminal penalties on antitrust viola-
tions in both interstate and foreign commerce, including:
(1) in the case of criminal actions brought by the DOJ,
indictment by grand jury and a full-blown criminal
investigation and trial, (2) in government civil cases, the
DOJ's broad powers to discover information through Civil
Investigative Demands (CIDS), and (3) in actions brought
by private plaintiffs (or the government when it is the
injured party), treble damages.47
Criminal prosecution under this Act is usually confined to
traditional per se violations of the law, including price-fixing, bid-
rigging, and other cartel conduct considered unlawful in most
48countries.
DOJ and the FTC with procedural devices to regulate mergers and acquisitions,
see id, and the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. % 61-65 (1994), which exempts
businesses from antitrust provisions for the limited purpose of collectively
exporting "goods, wares, or merchandise." Id. § 61.
43 See 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1994). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits
cartels and other anticompetitive concerted action: "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." Id. § 1.
Section 2 prohibits monopolistic conduct: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty...." Id. § 2.
44 Id. S 12-27.
4s Id. SS 13-13b, 21a.
46 Eleanor M. Fox, Abuse of a Dominant Position Under the Treaty of
Rome-A Comparison with U.S. Law, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES
OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 367, 369 (Barry E. Hawk ed.
1983) [hereinafter Fox, Abuse].
17 Stroock, supra note 39, at 114-15 (footnotes omitted).
41 See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Opera-
tions-1995, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCPI 13,107, at 20,589-3 (Apr. 5, 1995)
1996]
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The Clayton Act supplemented the Sherman Act by adding
prohibitions against interlocking directorates, exclusive dealing,
tying of deals, and acquisitions with the potential to substantially
decrease competition or create monopolies.49 Enforced jointly
by the DOJ and the FTC,50 as well as by private parties,"1 the
Clayton Act's non-criminal penalties apply to commerce "among
the several States and with foreign nations," like those of the
Sherman Act.53 Finally, the Robinson-Patman Act emerged from
the New Deal, prohibiting large retailers from selling goods at
discriminatorily low prices that would have disadvantaged small
retailers.54 Although the Robinson-Patman Act only prohibits
price discrimination within the United States, the Antidumping
Act of 191655 applies similar standards for the international
market."6
A close analysis of the statutory language reveals that extrater-
ritoriality concerns were a factor in each of these U.S. antitrust
acts. Each act provided an important means for attaining the two
central goals of U.S. antitrust law: preserving competition and
[hereinafter Enforcement Guidelines]. If the anticompetitive conduct cannot
be characterized as a per se violation, however, the government or private
plaintiff must submit to "rule of reason" analysis, which carries a heavier
burden of proof. See Donald I. Baker, Investigation and Proof of an Antitrust
Violation in the United States: A Comparative Look, in PROCEDURE AND
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 144, 147. "The per se rule is the trump card
of antitrust law. When an antitrust plaintiff successfully plays it, he need only
tally his score." Id. (citation omitted).
49 See 15 U.S.C. §5 12-27.
50 See MARIO MARQUES MENDEs, ANTITRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRE-
LATED EcONOMIEs 66 (1991). The FTC is an administrative agency composed
of one Chairperson and four Commissioners, whom the President appoints for
seven-year terms. See id. Like the DOJ, FTC appointments are sometimes
regarded as an extension of the President's will, thus emphasizing the executive
branch's role in antitrust enforcement. See id. at 66-67.
" See 15 U.S.C. S 15 (Supp. 1996).
52 Id. S 12.
-3 See id. S 2.
14 See Fox, Abuse, supra note 46, at 370.
55 See 15 U.S.C. S5 71-74. Note that the Robinson-Patman Act and the
Antidumping Act of 1916 apply primarily to unlawful trade practices and are
not the focus of competition convergence. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 18, at
362-65 (focusing on antitrust laws, the Sherman Act, Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act, and the case law arising from such provisions).
56 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 244,
24849 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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economic efficiency in the market.17  Accordingly, U.S. antitrust
legislation can sometimes implicate foreign nations whose
corporations face U.S. antitrust regulation." Extraterritoriality
subjects foreign defendants to unpalatable elements of U.S.
antitrust law.59 For instance, litigation of antitrust claims in the
United States is often slow and expensive,60 and "[f]or non-U.S.
defendants, treble damages are one of the most onerous aspects of
the U.S. antitrust laws."
61
In response to the extensive use of legislation that authorizes
extraterritoriality, foreign nations have developed numerous
defenses that aim to eliminate personal jurisdiction6 2 and thereby
evade prosecution before U.S. courts. 63 The entrance by the
" See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
924 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978)). See
also THOMAS PAWLIKOWSKI, INTRA-GROUP ARRANGEMENTS UNDER ARTI-
CLES 85 AND 86 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIc
COMMUNITY at v (1984). Antitrust legislation was initially intended to support
the political values of a free market and free enterprise. See Friedberg, supra
note 41, at 296. In the 1980's, the Supreme Court used antitrust laws to
protect a capitalist marketplace in which businesses of all sizes could survive
and disperse economic power. See Fox, Abuse, supra note 46, at 370. Some
academics, however, have reinterpreted the "goals" of antitrust legislation and
are now looking to balance political and social democracy with economic
efficiency. See MENDES, supra note 50, at 63-64 ("If one hundred years of
federal antitrust policy have taught us anything, it is that antitrust is both
political and cyclical." (citation omitted)).
58 See, e.g., Stroock, supra note 39, at 115-16 ("[C]hallenging cartels or
cartelizing behavior that affect the United States might have an effect in
[another country] on the profitability of exports or in discouraging such
practices as allocating customers or market allocation.").
19 See id. at 116.
60 See id.
61 Id. at 115.
62 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(requiring that a defendant have "certain minimum contacts" with the forum
state). Section 6 of the Sherman Act, however, grants a court in rem
jurisdiction to seize goods acquired "under any contract or by any combination
or pursuant to any conspiracy" that violates section 1. See PHILLP AREEDA
& LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 173 (4th ed. 1988).
In Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984), foreign airline corporations deliberately filed suits in the
United Kingdom to divest the U.S. Court of its jurisdiction. Ultimately,
however, the D.C. Circuit determined that the United States had the requisite
jurisdiction to enforce its antitrust laws and penalties against the f6reign
defendants. See 731 F.2d at 956.
63 See Stroock, supra note 39, at 136 n.34 (noting some antitrust defenses
used by foreign nations, including: "(1) the foreign sovereign compulsion
1!996)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
United States into international antitrust agreements that codify
a bilateral acceptance of its extraterritoriality policy may be an
attempt to limit the use of these defenses by foreign nations.
2.1.2. Case Law and Comity
A study of legislative antitrust acts alone, however, cannot
fully reveal the pervasiveness of extraterritoriality in U.S. antitrust
law. Whatever roots extraterritoriality has in legislation, the U.S.
courts' interpretation of the antitrust statutes has sustained
comity-based extraterritoriality as a focal point of antitrust policy
in the United States."4
In the 1945 decision United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica
("Alcoa"),65 Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit crafted
the "effects test"6 from the Sherman Antitrust Act.67 This test
authorizes U.S. jurisdiction in an antitrust claim against a foreign
defendant who engages in activity "intended to affect imports or
exports" and where "its performance is shown actually to have
had some effect upon them."" In addition, this decision rejected
the implications of an earlier Supreme Court opinion, American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,69 that jurisdiction is permissible
only where anticompetitive conduct touches U.S. territory.70 In
defense; (2) traditional antitrust immunities for petitioning foreign governmen-
tal action; (3) principles of foreign sovereign jurisdictional immunity; and (4)
the doctrine requiring judicial abstention from reviewing 'acts of state'"
(citations omitted)).
" Within the United States, "'[a]ntitrust is not the province of a single
government agency, or a sole congressional committee, private plaintiffs, or
courts. That is one of its virtues and one of its complexities.'" MENDES, supra
note 50, at 68 (quoting Professor Thomas Kauper). Antitrust enforcement is
a "quintuple" effort by the DOJ, the FTC, state governments, private parties,
and the federal courts. See Barry E. Hawk & James D. Veltrop, Dual Antitrust
Enforcement in the United States: Positive or Negative Lessons for the European
Community, in PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 12, at 21, 21.
65 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that an agreement between a
Canadian corporation and European aluminum manufacturers violated section
1 of the Sherman Act for its intended and actual effect on U.S. commerce).
66 Id. at 444.
67 See 15 U.S.C. S 1-7.
68 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
69 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (holding that the Supreme Court did not have
jurisdiction over acts by the Costa Rican government on foreign land).
70 See id. at 355-56.
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Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 1 the
Supreme Court abandoned its prior philosophy and explicitly
upheld the Alcoa doctrine.7 2
Although this principle remains central to U.S. antitrust law,
it has been judicially softened in response to foreign defendants'
opposition to the Second Circuit's sweeping judicial activism in
sanctioning extraterritorial jurisdiction.' In Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America,74 the Ninth Circuit tempered the effects
test by embedding a consideration of comity for foreign defen-
dants.7' Finding "substantial effects" to be a necessary, but not
sufficient, component for jurisdiction, the court developed a "rule
of reason" test and listed factors to be considered in balancing the
two competing interests involved-protection of U.S. competition
71 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
72 See id. at 704. ("[T]he domestic or foreign commerce of the United
States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the
conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries.").
7' The creation and subsequent retraction of a judicially created remedy
is not unique to antitrust law. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (limiting the fundamental "right to privacy" judicially constructed in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), from a penumbra of constitu-
tional amendments); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) (limiting the availability of private right of action under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, created in J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), to
actual purchasers or sellers of stock).
74 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
7s See id. at 612. The court acknowledged that U.S. notions of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction are not confined by international law or the text of the
Sherman Act, leaving the task of definition to the courts. See id. Thus, "[t]he
effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations'
interests. Nor does it expressly take into account the full nature of the
relationship between the actors and this country." Id. at 611-12 (footnote
omitted).
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
and respect for the rights of foreign defendants.7,6
Some appellate courts have evaded the Timberlane rule of
reason comity analysis,7 which limits the ability to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction, by aligning their holdings with that of
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,78 a case that leaves
the comity determination to the court's discretion.7 Nonethe-
less, the effects test remains a staple of U.S. decisional law and a
strong symbol of extraterritoriality 0 The Timberlane balance
frequently permits prosecution of conduct outside U.S. territo-
1y-81
The DOJ and FTC Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
encourage a comity analysis, similar to that employed in
Timberlane, that takes into account "all relevant factors. "82
76 See id. at 613-14. Factors considered in the Timberlane balancing
analysis include:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of
business of the corporations, the extent to which enforcement by
either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative
significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the
relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
' See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980)
(granting default judgments for plaintiff, Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
against nine foreign defendants who had fixed uranium prices and boycotted the
plaintiff's products); but see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986) (reinstating a district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of a Japanese television manufacturer because, according to
Justice Powell, "American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive
conditions of other nations' economies").
78 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
71 Id. at 1297-98 (advocating case-by-case balancing, using a discretionary
ten-factor test, of the interests and policies of each foreign nation against the
U.S. interest in maintaining competition).
" See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909 (1993)
(holding that the importation of goods to the United States is often intended
to affect U.S. commerce, making the critical question whether the effects were
produced in fact).
88 See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
82 Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 48, at 20,589-12. Relevant factors
include:
(1) the relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct within
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Furthermore, with respect to restraint on U.S. exports, the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 ("FTAIA")
codifies the effects test. 3 Thus, although arguably modified to
conform to the realities of international commerce, unilateral
extraterritoriality has nevertheless survived as a guiding principle
in the U.S. courts.8 4
the United States, as compared to conduct abroad; (2) the nationality
of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct; (3) the resence
or absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consumers, mar ets, or
exporters; (4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects
of the conduct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or
defeated by the action; (6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or
articulated forein economic policies; (7) the extent to which the
enforcement activities of another country with respect to the same
persons, including remedies resulting from those activities, may be
affected; and (8) the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared
to U.S. enforcement action.
Id. (citations omitted).
3 See 15 U.S.C. S 6a (1994). The Act provides that "acts affecting export
trade are illegal only if they have a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect on U. . domestic commerce or if they harm the export trade or export
commerce of a person engaged in such commerce in the United States."
Stroock, supra note 39, at 120 (quoting Joel Davidow, a partner with the
Washington, D.C. law firm Albondi, Foster, Sobin & Davidowr). However, the
legislative history of the Act clarifies that restraints on imports continue to be
governed by case law. See H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490-91.
In passing the FTAIA, Congress held a two-fold view of the purpose of
extraterritorial antitrust laws: (1) to protect U.S. consumers, "and (2) to
preserve U.S. export opportunities." The Proposed Application of the U.S.
Antitrust Laws to Foreign Markets: Report of the Commercial and Federal Litiga-
tion Section of the New York State Bar Association, WORLD COMPETITION: LAW
& ECON. REV., Sept. 1991, at 143, 147 (emphasis omitted).
4 Compare Friedberg, supra note 41, at 298-308 (arguing that U.S. case law,
and other materials which replicate the effects test-the Restatements (Second
and Third) of Foreign Relations Law, the FTAIA, and the Department of
Justice's/FTC Guidelines-collectively represent a retrenchment of the effects
doctrine).
Roger Alford describes "a two-tiered test" in the United States for
authorizing extraterritoriality. First, there is a statutory standard for
determining whether there is a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable"
effect on U.S. commerce. Alford, Application, supra note 21, at 217. Grafted
on to this determination is a second tier, a common law analysis of whether,
in light of international comity concerns, jurisdiction should be exercised under
the instant facts. See id.
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. 1. Int'l Econ. L.
2.2. Tension between the European Commission and the European
Court of Justice in the EU
In contrast to the three branches of U.S. government, four
institutions comprise the EU: the European Commission, 85 the
Council of Ministers,86 the European Parliament,7 and the
ECJ.88 The first three of these institutions collectively perform
a legislative function, in which "the [European] Commission
proposes, the [European] Parliament advises[,] and the Council [of
Ministers] decides. Acts of [EU] institutions may be subject to
judicial review by [the fourth component of the EU,] the [ECJ]." 9
Because this centralized enforcement system is largely directed
by the European Commission" and invites case law interpreta-
tion which generally parallels the Commission's perspective, one
would expect a uniform attitude regarding extraterritoriality.
Despite the European Commission's endorsement of a U.S. effects-
15 See EEC TREATY arts. 155-63. The European Commission consists of
seventeen members, apportioned among twenty-two Directorates General
(DGs"). See A Brief Introduction to European Law, available in WL, ECLAW,
CELEX-LEG Data ase, at *1 [hereinafter European Law]. This governmental
body: (1) develops EU poli roposes legis 2 executes EuropeanConcl ecson ad liyand oselgation,'
ouncil decsons nd aintain po icy enforcement; and (3) commences legal
actions against Member States, corporations, and indviduals who do not
comply with EU law. See id.
86 See EEC TREATY arts. 14548, 150. One or more representatives from
each Member State sits on the Council of Ministers, the EU's supreme rule-
making body. See European Law, supra note 85, at *1.
" See EEC TREATY arts. 137-44. The citizens of the Member States
directly elect the European Parliament, which in 1992 was comprised of 518
members. See European Law, supra note 85, at 112. With the exception of some
budgetary legislative power, tMis body serves an advisory function and is
charged with overseeing the European Commission's activities. See id.
88 See EEC TREATY arts. 164-88. The governments of the Member States
each appoint one judge to the ECJ, which, with the aid of six advocates gener-
al, interprets EU law. See European Law, supra note 85, at '12. The ECJ
presides in cases against other EU institutions as well as against Member States
which violate treaty provisions. See id. Upon request by national courts of the
Member States, this body interprets EU law through advisory opinions. See id.
In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty acknowledged the Court of First Instance,
which has initial jurisdiction over certain matters as determined by statute. See
EEC TREATY art. 168a.
89 CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 33, 402.
90 Although the European Commission is roughly analogous to an
executive branch, it does possess legislative and judicial powers of its own, see
EEC TREATY art. 155, which it shares with the Council of Ministers, see id. art.
145, and the ECJ. See id. art. 164.
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based version of extraterritoriality, however, the ECJ has been
reluctant to implement this policy. Its decisions reflect a refusal
to extend jurisdiction when doing so would conflict with the
"economic unit doctrine," a variant of the traditional territorial
requirement.91 The EU's continuing division over how to define
and implement extraterritoriality fosters the relatively weak role
the doctrine plays in EU jurisprudence as compared to the United
States.
2.2.1. Legislation that Furthers Union Integration
In contrast to the U.S. goals of promoting competition,
protecting consumers, and maintaining efficiency within its own
borders, the predominant motive behind the EU's antitrust
jurisprudence has been the creation of a single market. 2 In
pursuit of this objective, EU legislation strives to prevent
anticompetitive conduct from hindering integration." Social and
political values dominate EU antitrust policy, while economic
efficiency remains subordinate. 4 The original legislation that
addresses anticompetitive business practices in the EU is found in
articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.95
Today, the EU's Merger Regulation, 96 adopted in 1990 as a
preventive device to keep markets "sufficiently unconcentrated to
enable workable competition and entry by those who so wish," 7
91 SIR LEON BRITTAN, COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER CONTROL
IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 7-9 (1991). Under the "economic unit
doctrine," the ECJ will not assume jurisdiction over an entity that is not a part
of an economic unit with a party that has conducted an antitrust violation on
EU territory. See id. at 7-8. By according traditional territorial concerns more
importance than international comity concerns, the ECJ reinforces that its
paramount concern is the promotion of Union solidarity. See Griffin, supra
note 18, at 378-79.
92 See MENDES, supra note 50, at 74. The Treaty of Rome provides for "a
system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted" as
a mode for achieving this market integration. EEC TREATY art. 3(f.
91 The promotion of competition, however, has been regarded as a
secondary goal. See PAWLIKOWSKI, supra note 57, at v.
94 See MENDES, supra note 50, at 83.
9s See EEC TREATY arts. 85-86.
96 Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 1990 OJ. (L 257) 14 [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
97 TIMOTHY G. PORTWOOD, MERGERS UNDER EEC COMPETITION LAW
8 (1994).
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may be of greater practical significance than articles 85 and 86.98
The Merger Regulation requires parties to notify the Commission
before commencing a transaction which exceeds certain thresh-
olds.9  Following notification, the Commission has the power
to enjoin progression of any concentration that "creates or
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective
competition would be significantly impeded in the common
market or in a substantial part of it."1°° Nonetheless, as a
regulation cannot supersede the EEC Treaty, "there is scope for
residual application of articles 85 and 86 ... , particularly to those
mergers falling below the thresholds for Community dimension,
when inter-state trade is affected." 0 1 Moreover, articles 85 and
86 continue to govern concentrations in the public sector.0 2
While the Merger Regulation may effect the nature and treatment
of cases formerly brought under articles 85 and 86,103 the text of
articles 85 and 86 is nonetheless instructive for comprehending the
origin of competition policies in the EU.
Despite strong facial similarities with sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome do not
intend to replicate the U.S. provisions.'1° Like section 1 of the
9' The Merger Regulation regulates most "concentrations" that were
formerly addressed under Articles 85 or 86. See id. at 17. Thus, with respect
to mergers that do not fall within Article 3(1)'s definition of a "concentration,"
Articles 85 and 86 have been largely displaced. See id. at 19-20.
99 See VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETI-
TION LAW AND PRACTICE 238 (5th ed., Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1994). One
author summarizes the threshold criteria contained in Article 1 of the Merger
Regulation as requiring
a 'Community dimension' which is a size of parties test, and compris-
[ing] three elements: worldwide turnover of the parties combined,
Community wide turnover of at least two of the parties, and a two
thirds rule, whereby if all parties generate their Community turnover
in the same Member state, the transaction falls under the jurisdiction
of the relevant national merger authority.
PORTWOOD, supra note 97, at 20.
100 Merger Regulation, supra note 96, art. 2.
101 PORTWOOD, supra note 97, at 19.
102 See id.
103 For a discussion of how the Merger Regulation invites ideological
conflict between the European Commission and the ECJ, see discussion infra
Section 5.
104 One commentator warns that attempting to understand Articles 85 and
86 by comparing and contrasting them to the U.S. provisions is "dangerous."
Federal, State, Foreign Trends are Examined at ABA Spring Meeting, 1560
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Sherman Act, article 85 of the Treaty of Rome targets cartels and
concerted actions.0 5 Specifically, article 85 renders "automatical-
ly void"1" any "agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings[,] and concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market."107
Ostensibly analogous to section 2 of the Sherman Act, article
86 of the Treaty prohibits monopolization, which is defined as
"[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it ... in so
far as it may affect trade between Member States."' 8 This ban
on unilateral conduct complements article 85's restriction on
bilateral, concerted activities.1°9
Because articles 85 and 86 are considered "directly effective"
provisions, national courts of the Member States also have
authority to review them under EU law 10  Enforcement
through the national courts, however, is less common than
enforcement by the European Commission and the ECJ.1
Unlike the United States, the EU does not allow private parties
to recover treble damages, thereby reducing their incentive to
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 457, 461 (1992) [hereinafter ABA
Meeting].
105 See EEC TREATY art. 85.
106 Id. art. 85(2).
107 Id. art. 85(1). Article 85 includes particular examples of such activities,
which have been interpreted to encompass "the allocation of markets and
customers, price fixing and price discrimination, arrangements akin to tying,
and cartels." ABA Meeting, supra note 104, at 461. For a definition of
"undertaking," see supra note 12.
Article 85(3) lists exemptions for practices "which contribute[] to
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit." EEC TREATY art. 85(3).
108 EEC TREATY art. 86 (listing specific instances of "abuse").
109 See Fox, Abuse, supra note 46, at 367-68.
1I EEC TREATY art. 189 (stating that a regulation "shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States ... but [a directive] shall
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods").
"' See MENDES, supra note 50, at 82. In the EU, the European Commis-
sion is given disproportionate enforcement power compared to the DOJ and
the FTC in the United States, and has been described as "rulemaker, policeman,
prosecutor and judge, all rolled into one." Id. (citation omitted); see also
discussion infra Section 2.2.2.
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bring article 85 and 86 claims in the national courts. 12  Even
when such claims are brought by private parties, the national
courts often defer to the anticipated ruling of the European
Commission."'
Textually, articles 85 and 86 lack the inherently broad
inclusion of foreign commerce contained in the Sherman Act." 4
Although the language of these articles somewhat mimics the
"effects test" crafted by U.S. case law, the articles evoke a different
sentiment that conflicts with the ECJ's favored theme of Europe-
an integration."' The words alone did not embrace the notion
of "extraterritoriality" until interpreted as such by the European
Commission.
2.2.2. Case Law and Diluted Comity
While in the United States statutory interpretation is an
integrated product of numerous enforcement bodies, the EU's
system of interpretation is Commission-governed.1 6  With
respect to many issues, the European Commission is regarded as
the most "supranational" branch of government in the EU,
implying that it is the branch most devoted to the goal of
European integration."7  Given this objective, all of the
Commission's decisions are arguably made with an emphasis on
unity. 11
8
112 In the context of Article 85, the European Commission has the
ultimate power to declare an anticompetitive agreement void, permitting a
national court to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ or the European
Commission itself before ruling on the validity of the agreement. See FOLSOM,
supra note 33, at 325. Under Article 86, an injunctive penalty is not available,
thereby effectively granting the national court discretion to apply its own
remedy. See id. at 326.
113 See MENDES, supra note 50, at 82.
114 See 15 U.S.C. S 1; EEC TREATY arts. 85-86.
115 The "effect" language in Articles 85 and 86 does not suggest that any
anticompetitive activity having an effect on EU commerce might be subject to
regulation by the EU. See discussion supra Section 2.1.2. Rather, the wording
merely "engages [EU] jurisdiction alongside the possible application of the
competition laws of the Member States. It tells us little about the limitations
which [EU] law provides in respect of its jurisdiction vis-a'-vis foreign
companies or States." BRITTAN, supra note 91, at 5.
116 See Friedberg, supra note 41, at 322.
117 See id.
"I See id. at 322-23.
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European Council Regulation 17119 gives the European
Commission, through its Directorate General for Competition
("DG IV"), the authority to investigate individual corporations
and trade associations in antitrust actions.120 The procedure is
similar to that used by the European Commission when it
determines that a Member State has violated a competition
provision of the EEC Treaty; in both instances the European
Commission issues a "reasoned opinion" supporting its posi-
tion.12 1  If a private enterprise or Member State opposes the
European Commission's opinion, it may request a review by the
ECJ.'" The ECJ, however, reviews the European Commission
decisions only for improper procedure, adequate and accurate
factual support, or abuse of power,1 3 and generally defers to the
notices issued by the European Commission through which it
expresses its enforcement policies and guidelines.2 4
Although this practice significantly decreases meaningful
judicial review,"z some commentators applaud it.126  One pro-
ponent argues that "since the [European] Commission is the
executive arm of the [EU], it makes perfect sense that it should
establish its own role as principal enforcer of European competi-
119 See Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 J.O. (204), 1959-62 O.J. SPEc. ED.
87 [hereinafter CounciFRegulation 17]; see also KORAH, supra note 99, at 109.
By channelling competition enforcement through the Commission, Council
Regulation 17 strives for uniform enforcement of competition rules within the
EC. See id.
120 For an example of this procedure, see discussion supra Section 1. In
addition to its investigatory powers, the European Commission may also
impose fines, periodic p-enalty fees, and cease and desist orders, as well as grant
negative clearances and exemptions. See MENDES, supra note 50, at 80.
121 See EEC TREATY art. 169.
" See Council Regulation 17, supra note 119, art. 9(3). The ECJ's role is
to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the EEC] Treaty the
law is observed." EEC TkEATY art. 164.
123 See MENDES, supra note 50, at 82.
124 Id. at 81. "Notices" are similar to, although often accorded greater
weight than, the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines issued by the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ and the FTC. See id. at 82.
12 See id. In 1988, to improve the review process, the Council of
Ministers established the Court of First Instance to hear direct actions brought
against the Council or European Commission with regard to competition rules.
See id. at 82.
126 Barry Hawk, a law professor at Fordham University, praises this
"highly centralized system" and contrasts it with "the Byzantine proliferation
of statutes, enforcement bodies[,] and fora in the United States." Id.
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tion law ... and should expand the international reach of that
law in a way that validates its international legal personality."'
17
With regard to extraterritorial application of the EU's laws,
the European Commission has supplemented its own integration
policy with U.S. notions of comity.2 ' By contrast, the ECJ's
opinions traditionally have been rooted in the "economic unit"
philosophy, thereby avoiding discussion or endorsement of
extraterritoriality policy.129 For example, in Imperial Chem.
Indus. v. Commission ("Dyestuffs"), 3° the ECJ ignored both the
European Commission and the recommendations of the ECJ's
own Advocate General 3' in explicitly adopting the U.S. Alcoa
effects test.132 To avoid considering the question of whether
conduct occurring outside a Member State produced effects within
its borders, the court deliberately based its decision solely upon its
own economic unit doctrine and found that, because the defen-
dants owned subsidiaries within what was then referred to as the
European Community "EC", jurisdiction was appropriate.'33
Until 1985, the two philosophies peacefully coexisted, permitting
the ECJ to uphold most European Commission decisions to
extend the EC's laws to foreign defendants. 34  Thus, it is
"2 Friedberg, supra note 41, at 322-23.
See Alford, Application, supra note 21, at 28-30; Brian Pearce, Note, The
Comity Doctrine as a Barrier to Judicial Jurisdiction: A U.S.-E. U. Comparison, 30
STAN. J. INT'L L. 525, 576 (1994).
129 See BRrrTAN, supra note 91, at 7-9; Alford, Application, supra note 21,
at 30-37.
130 See Case 48/69 Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission, 18 E.C.R. 619,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder], 11 C.M.L.R. 557 (1972) [hereinafter Dyestuffs]
(asserting jurisdiction over three foreign defendants only because the concerted
conduct of their subsidiary companies actually occurred "within the Common
Market" under Article 85).
13' The Advocate General is a member of the ECJ, with status equal to
that of the judges, who issues an independent opinion prior to judgment. See
KORAH, supra note 99, at 289. This opinion is frequently more detailed than
the ECJ's ultimate judgment, as it attempts to express to the other judges what
the Advocate General believes are the crucial issues. See id. at 289-90.
132 See Friedberg, supra note 41, at 310.
133 See id. at 311. For a definition of the economic unit doctrine, see supra
note 91.
131 See Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA &
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 13 C.M.L.R. 309
(1974) (granting injunctive relief against a Maryland corporation that violated
Article 86 because the company was a 51% shareholder in an Italian firm); Case
6/72, Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 1973
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apparent that the extraterritoriality doctrine espoused by the
United States and the integration doctrine of the EU are not
mutually exclusive philosophies in every scenario.
In 1985, however, a case finally arose "in which the economic
unit theory, for all its elasticity, [supposedly] could not be
stretched to cover truly non-European actors, whose actions
outside the Community [were affecting] EC competition."135 In
the Wood Pulp case,'36 the European Commission initially
applied the Alcoa effects test to find an article 85 price-fixing
violation among wood pulp producers, although none of the
defendants were located within the EC' 3 Sir Leon Brittan, a
vice president of the European Commission charged with
overseeing the DG IV, viewed the European Commission's Wood
Pulp decision as consistent with earlier Commission endorsements
of the effects test. 3'
After a long-awaited review four years later, the ECJ reluctant-
ly affirmed the European Commission's decision. 39 The Court
concluded that "the [EC]'s jurisdiction to apply its competition
rules to such conduct [was] covered by the territoriality principle
as universally recognized in public international law" because the
foreign producers sold directly to purchasers inside the EC in
order to "implement" an agreement formed elsewhere.1"
E.C.R. 215, 12 C.M.L.R. 199 (1973) (construing jurisdiction in an Article 86
action over a U.S. defendant merely because the U.S. corporation had a wholly-
owned subsidiary incorporated on Member State territory).
135 Friedberg, supra note 41, at 318.
136 Commission Decision 85/202 Re Wood Pulp Cartel, 1985 OJ. (L 85)
1.
137 See id. Only some of the defendants in Wood Pulp had subsidiaries or
agencies within EC territory. See BRrrTAN, supra note 91, at 10.
138 See BRITTAN, supra note 91, at 10; Wayne D. Collins, The Coming of
Age of EC Competition Policy, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 249, 249 (1992). The
Commission endorsements to which Sir Brittan refers are those preceding the
Dyestuffs case, 18 E.C.R. at 619, 11 C.M.L.R. at 557. See also Commission
Decision 206/85 on Aluminum Imports, 1985 O.J. (L 92) 1 (European
Commission extended jurisdiction based on defendants' "implied presence");
BRITTAN, supra note 91, at 10.
I" See Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125-29/85, Ahlstrim
Osakeyhti6 et al. v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 [hereinafter Wood Pulp].
140 See id. at 5243. Sir Leon Brittan denotes the ECJ's jurisdictional
assessment as an "implementation" analysis which views anticompetitive
conduct as having two parts: the agreement and the implementation. See
BRrTTAN, supra note 91, at 11-12. Since "[j]urisdiction over conduct cannot
depend solely on the place of formation of the agreement because undertakings
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Although several statements in the opinion, when coupled with
the holding, imply the use of an effects test, the opinion seeming-
ly sponsored a "modified effects doctrine." 41 Notably, the
Court did not repeat the explicit Alcoa language found in the
European Commission decision." Although the ECJ did not
blatantly reject extraterritorial comity principles, it stretched to
find jurisdictional authority based on the defendants' sufficient
links to EC territory.143
The U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines have recognized
this weak endorsement, conceding that "the 'implementation' test
adopted in the ECJ usually produces the same outcome as the
'effects' test employed in the United States."' 44  Therefore,
unlike in the United States, a uniform conception of comity
principles does not exist in the EU. While the European
Commission willingly endorses the U.S. doctrine of extraterritori-
ality, the ECJ remains partial to territorial requirements. The
difference in opinion between these two EU political bodies
exemplifies the difficulties that arise when the EU attempts
antitrust convergence with the United States.
3. THE PROCEDURAL RISE AND FALL OF THE 1991 AGREE-
MENT
3.1. The Attempt to Synergize Competition Policies
On September 23, 1991, the United States and the European
Commission signed' 45 a bilateral agreement composed of eleven
cannot be given such an easy way of escaping their responsibilities[,] ... the
second element, the place of implementation, must be aecisive." Id. at 12.
"I See Friedberg, supra note 41, at 321.
142 See Commission Decision 85/202 Re Wood Pulp Cartel, 1985 OJ. (L
85) 15, para. 79 ("The effect of the agreements and practices on prices
announced and/or charged to customers and on resale of pulp within the
[European Economic Community] was therefore not only substantial but
intended, as was the primary and direct result of the agreements and practic-
es.").
es 3 See Pearce, supra note 128, at 575-76 (noting the court's ambiguity in
rejecting the foreign defendants' jurisdictional defense). One commentator
notes that "the Court of Justice in one sentence appears to wholly reject a
doctrine that U.S. courts have been wrestling with for over fifteen years."
Alford, Application, supra note 21, at 37.
144 Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 48, at 20,589-8 n.51.
141 Representatives of the signatories included acting Attorney General
William P. Barr for the DOJ, Janet L. Steiger for the FTC, and Sir Leon
[Vol. 17:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss3/5
ANTITRUST DIALOGUE
articles'46 which aimed to "promote cooperation and coordina-
tion and [to] lessen the possibility or impact of differences
between the [United States and the EC] in the application of their
competition laws."1 47  The Agreement was labeled "executive"
or "administrative," not legislative, 148 and therefore it did not
purport to alter the existing laws of either party.'49
Although several provisions are considered "unprecedented" in
their degree of support for coordinated enforcement and informa-
tion sharing, many of the Agreement's provisions are not
completely unique to bilateral agreements.' Article II requires
a participant to "notify the other whenever its competition
authorities become aware that their enforcement activities may
affect important interests of the other [p]arty,"' subject to a
participant's obligation to maintain confidentiality pursuant to
article VIII, 52 and to enforce its own existing laws pursuant to
article IX.Y13 Article III establishes a procedure whereby the
Brittan on behalf of the European Commission. See Agreement, supra note 15,
30 I.L.M. at 1502.
146 The articles of the Agreement have the following headings:
Article I: Purpose and Definitions
Article I: Notification
Article IlI: Exchange of Information
Article IV: Cooperation and Coordination in Enforcement Activities
Article V: Cooperation Regarding Anticompetitive Activities in the
Territory of One Party that Adversely Affect the Interests of the
Other Party
Article VI: Avoidance of Conflicts Over Enforcement Activities
Article VII: Consultation
Article VIII: Confidentiality of Information
Article IX: Existing Law
Article X: Communications Under this Agreement
Article XI: Entry into Force, Termination and Review
See id. at 1492-1502.
147 Id. art. I, at 1492.
4 See Haagsma, supra note 34, at 233.
149 See Agreement, supra note 15, art. IX, 30 I.L.M. at 1501.
150 See Charles F. Rule, Introduction to European Communities-United
States: Agreement on the Application of their Competition Laws, Sept. 23,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1487, 1487 (1991).
151 Agreement, supra note 15, art. II, 30 I.L.M. at 1493.
152 See id. art. VIE, at 1501.
153 See id. art. IX, at 1501. For example, the United States would not be
able to disclose information under The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 7A(h) (1994), which precludes sharing
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entities agree to meet twice a year to exchange information,
although the exchange is limited by confidentiality and existing
legislation.T 4 In article IV, the Agreement outlines an explicit
analysis for determining which cases merit coordinated enforce-
ment,15 5 recognizing that "[in cases where both [p]arties have an
interest in pursuing enforcement activities with regard to related
situations, they may agree that it is in their mutual interest to
coordinate."" 6 Finally, article VII provides for prompt consulta-
tions between the participants, "with a view to reaching mutually
satisfactory conclusions," at the request of one of the parties. 5 '
Articles V and VI are completely innovative components of
the bilateral agreement, not merely in degree, but in content as
well. Article V codifies a "positive comity" doctrine that gives
each party the right to request intervention of the other in order
to curtail anticompetitive conduct affecting the requesting nation's
market.'58 Article VI is also novel in that it codifies "tradition-
confidential information obtained through premerger notification procedures.
See James F. Rill & Virginia R. Metallo, The Next Step: Convergence of Procedure
and Enforcement, 1992, in 1992 ANNuAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY
15, 24 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1993).
154 See Agreement, supra note 15, art. III, 30 I.L.M. at 1495-96. Specifically,
the parties agree to discuss their "enforcement activities and priorities, ...
economic sectors of common interest, . . . policy changes which they are
considering, and.., other matters of mutual interest relating to the application
of competition laws." Id.
155 See id. art. IV, at 1496-97.
156 Id. Factors to be considered include:
the opportunit to make more efficient use of their resources
evoted to the enforcement activities;
(b) the relative abilities of the Parties' competition authorities to obtain
information necessary to conduct the enforcement activities;
(c) the effect of such coordination on the ability of both Parties to
achieve the objectives of their enforcement activities; and
(d) the possibility of reducing costs incurred by persons subject to the
enforcement activities.
Id.
Id. art. VII, at 1500. This Agreement uniquely enforces "structured
semi-annual consultations" and "[calls] for consultations not only as to action
by the antitrust enforcement agencies but also by regulatory agencies which
could affect the interest of the other party." Rill & Metallo, supra note 136, at
24.
158 See Agreement, Supra note 15, art. V, 30 I.L.M. at 1497-98. The party
receiving the request is not compelled to abdicate such anticompetitive
activities, see id., in which case the requesting party is relegated to its own
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al" or "negative comity," whereby each side considers "important
interests of the other [p]arty in decisions as to whether or not to
initiate an investigation or proceeding, the scope of an investiga-
tion or proceeding, [and] the nature of the remedies or penalties
sought."159 By redirecting the ECJ's focus from the positive and
negative comity provisions to the notification, information-
sharing, and consultation aspects, the Agreement will enjoy a
more secure existence in the EU.
3.2. The Procedural Failure of the Agreement: French Republic v.
Commission' 6
On August 9, 1994, France, supported by Spain and the
Netherlands, successfully persuaded the ECJ that the Agreement
violated article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty.1 61 Under article 228,
the European Commission has the power to negotiate agreements
with foreign states, but "such agreements shall be concluded by the
Council, after consulting the European Parliament."162 Unper-
suaded by the European Commission's protests that, as an
administrative agreement, the bilateral competition pact should be
exempted from article 228, the Court determined that the
Commission had exceeded its powers by enacting an agreement
"intended to have legal effect"'63 and subsequently voided the
Agreement.'"
Concededly, this holding exclusively addresses procedural
aspects of the Agreement; it does not purport to implicate
competition law. By singularly concluding an international
agreement, the European Commission overstepped the limits of
its institutional powers. 65  The opinion also "hamstring[s] the
[European] [C]ommission's ability to play an enhanced role on the
policy of extraterritorial enforcement. See discussion supra Section 2.
'19 Agreement, supra note 15, art. VI, 30 I.L.M. at 1499.
160 Case 327/91, French Republic v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 3641.
161 See id. at 3673.
162 EEC TREATY art. 228(1) (as amended 1993) (emphasis added).
163 Case 327/91, French Republic v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 3641, 3647
(citation omitted).
16 See id. at 3678.
165 See Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 838 (stating the possible implications
of the ECJ's determination prior to the issuance of the opinion).
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international stage."1 66  The ECJ's explicit restriction of the
European Commission's authority, however, calls attention to the
ideological tension between the two governmental bodies.
167
Meaningful reimplementation of the Agreement will require both
an acknowledgement that the European Commission and the ECJ
"[do not] always see eye-to-eye anymore"168 and a strategy to
resolve their differences.
4. AN ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE: WHY THE ECJ
JEOPARDIZES THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT
The ECJ purportedly nullified the Agreement for improper
procedure, specifically finding that the European Commission
lacked the "internal power ... to alter the allocation of powers
between the Community institutions with regard to the conclu-
sion of international agreements."'69 In other words, the ECJ
found that the European Commission abused its power by
speaking for the entire Union. Past conduct of the ECJ, however,
suggests that it also is not prepared to suspend its vigilant pursuit
of traditional territoriality and view competition policy through
the lens of U.S. extraterritoriality.' Without the Court's
support, the EU as a whole is not prepared to vigorously enforce
this aggressive competition agreement with the United States.
In the preamble to the Agreement, the two parties enumerate
the considerations that inspired their joint action,17 1 suggesting
that both parties entered the Agreement with common motives,
philosophies, and vocabularies.' Developments in antitrust law
may have contributed to the illusion that the United States and
166 Charles Goldsmith, EC-U.S. Antitrust Accord is Set Back by Court
Ruling, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 17, 1993, at 2 [hereinafter Goldsmith, Accord
Is Set Back]. For example, the decision also sets back negotiations for a similar
competition agreement between the EU and Canada. See id.
167 See discussion supra Section 2.2.2.
168 Charles Goldsmith, European Union: Making the Market Work, WALL
ST. J. EUR, July 19, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Goldsmith, Market].
169 Case 327/91, French Republic v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 3641, 3678.
170 See discussion supra Section 2.2.2.
171 See Agreement, supra note 15, at 1491.
172 The preamble notes that "the Government of the United States ... and
the Commission of the European Communities share the view that the sound
and effective enforcement of competition law is a matter of importance to the
efficient operation of their respective markets and to trade between them." Id.
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the EU were finally speaking the same language of competi-
tion.173 The Agreement's disproportionate embodiment of U.S.
policies, however, may imperil its effectiveness now that it has
been reenacted. 74
4.1. The Basis for the Illusion of Convergence
Approaching 1991, circumstantial evidence existed in the
United States and what was then the EC showing that both were
retreating from their respective policies of vigorous extraterritori-
ality and traditional territoriality. For instance, over a century of
U.S. case law seemed to dilute the Sherman Act's forceful
assertion of authority to regulate the commerce of foreign
states. 175 Furthermore, frustrated by difficulties in unilaterally
applying its laws to anticompetitive conduct in Japan, the United
States acknowledged a need to retreat from its previously
aggressive extraterritoriality doctrine.
176
Simultaneously, in the EC, the outcome in Wood Pulp"
symbolized the potential for a doctrinal shift further away from
singular reliance on traditional policy and closer to the U.S. Alcoa
test.17 ' Furthermore, in 1990 the EC adopted a Merger Regula-
tion179 extending the Commission's jurisdiction to non-member
States effecting a threshold level of commerce within the EC.180
173 See discussion infra Section 4.1.
17 See discussion infra Section 4.2.
175 See discussion supra Section 2.1.
176 See Stroock, supra note 39, at 114-15. Although the United States
genuinely seems to perceive its antitrust laws as a "charter of economic liberty,"
other countries view the laws as protectionist legislation. See J. Paul McGrath,
Views From the Justice Department-Enforcement Policy and Current Issues in
International Trade, in 1984 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLIcIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 269, 277 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1985) ("Therefore, it is truly
essential that private parties and the courts seek to apply [U.S.] antitrust laws
in a way that is compatible with maintaining open markets, and that they
consider the broader political ramifications of the offensive use of the antitrust
laws.").
177 1988 E.C.R. 5193.
17 See discussion supra Section 2.2.2.
179 See Merger Regulation, supra note 96. Merger regulation is generally
effectuated through a simple requirement to notify an antitrust enforcement
body of premerger plans. See KORAH, supra note 99, at 237.
110 For a general overview of the practical application of the Merger
Regulation, see supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
19961
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Mutual reliance on a 1986 recommendation by the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
18 1
was another indicator that the parties had an equal understanding
of the Agreement's provisions and goals.' The 1986 recom-
mendation advocated notification procedures, consultation,
coordinated enforcement, and consideration of the legitimate
interests of other nations in competition enforcement.'83 Exam-
ples of activities meriting notification include document requests,
location of witnesses, and case investigations that implicate foreign
information or individuals.1 4  The OECD's policies have
influenced its member nations to engage in special bilateral
agreements called mutual legal assistance treaties ("MLATs"); by
the mid-1980s, both the United States 85 and the EC had entered
into MLATs with other countries.
While agreements involving the EU generally establish
substantive rules with nations lacking vigilant competition
policies'86 "to ensure that trade between the [EU] and those
181 As of September 1996, the number of member countries in the OECD
stood at 28. See Eduardo Lachica, Korea's Path to Joining OECD Shortens as Key
Tests Are Passed, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1996, at 13 (listing the OECD's
28 members and predicting South Korea's admission before the year's end).
This group of advanced industrialized nations has developed its own non-
binding competition guidelines, and its semiannual meetings enable participating
countries to discuss policies, develop guidelines, and exchange information. See
Rill & Metallo, supra note 153, at 27.
182 See Agreement, supra note 15, 30 I.L.M. at 1491.
183 See Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning
Cooperation Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices
Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C (86)44 (Final) (May 21, 1986).
184 See Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 48, at 20,589-8.
18. See Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation
and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws,
Mar. 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., 23 I.L.M. 275; Agreement Relating to Cooperation on
Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl., 34 U.S.T. 388; Agreement
Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June
23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956 (entered into force Sept. 11, 1976). More
recently, the United States entered into a second agreement with Canada. See
Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition and Deceptive Marketing
Practices Laws, Aug. 3, 1995, U.S.-Can., 35 1L.M. 309. This agreement is de-
signed "to promote cooperation and coordination between the competition
authorities of the Parties, . . . and, in addition, to establish a framework for
cooperation and coordination with respect to enforcement of deceptive
marketing practices laws." Id., art. 1(1), 35 I.L.M. at 312.
186 See Haagsma, supra note 34, at 229. Cyprus and Israel, for example, are
nations without vigilant competition policies. See id. at 229-30.
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countries is not distorted by anti-competitive practices, "187 the
United States has concluded agreements with other countries in
order to avert conflict resulting from the extraterritorial applica-
tion of its own laws.188 Thus, the parties' past manifestations of
the OECD policy reflect two different goals of competition: the
EU's desire to promote internal economic unity and the United
States' desire to protect its capital market. This demonstration of
different approaches to a common source of competition policy
foreshadows the potential for different interpretations of the
Agreement's provisions.
4.2. Embodiment of U.S. Policies
An analysis of the Agreement's terms reveals striking parallels
between its two comity provisions-articles V and VI-and U.S.
competition policy. The ECJ's demonstrated aversion to comity
concerns is likely to endanger future effectiveness of the reenact-
ment. Although not dispositive of U.S. bias, both signatories
acknowledged the role of efficiency, a traditional goal of the
United States.8 9 Consideration of the anticipated benefit to
consumers reflects another traditional U.S. aspect of competition
policy.
190
The Agreement's substantive comity provisions most convinc-
ingly demonstrate the considerable level of U.S. influence. Article
VI essentially codifies the U.S. effects test, which advocates
negative or traditional comity.191 The Agreement's procedure
187 Id. at 230.
188 See id. at 230-31.
189 See Agreement, supra note 15, 30 I.L.M. at 1491; see also Alford,
Application, supra note 21, at 47 (I[T]he parties shall consider, inter alia,
whether such coordination will result in increased efficiency.. . ."); Rule, supra
note 150, at 1490 (discussing the hope that U.S. and EU antitrust authorities
"will work together to minimize the disruption to international trade that
multiple, uncoordinated investigations otherwise might cause"); U.S., EC
Commission Sign Antitrust Cooperation Accord, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1407,
1407 (Sept. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Sign Accord] ("The new coordination is
intended to lead to agreements about which jurisdiction should take the lead
in investigating a particular matter, contributing to a more efficient allocation
of enforcement resources . . ").
190 See Alford, Application, supra note 21, at 47 (noting the parties'
consideration of whetier coordination "will reduce the costs incurred by
persons subject to the enforcement activities"); Sign Accord, supra note 189, at
1407 (referring to a statement by FTC Chairperson Janet Steiger).
191 See Agreement, supra note 15, art. VI, 30 I.L.M. at 1498-1500.
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for this comity determination resembles the balance of interest
effects test crafted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Timberlane9  and endorsed by the U.S. DOJ's 1988
Enforcement Guidelines.
193
Moreover, since 1991, the United States has expanded the
Agreement's scope to include domestic activities, reflecting the
synchrony between the Agreement and U.S. policies. 194  For
example, the most recent Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations, issued jointly by the DOJ and the FTC,
introduce provisions taken from article VI of the Agreement into
the traditional effects balance.' 9 Furthermore, in Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California,19' a significant post-Agreement decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court intimated that it would vigorously
support the comity determinations advocated by the U.S. enforce-
ment bodies. By holding that conflicts of law will not impact
extensions of jurisdiction where defendants can comply with the
laws of both the United States and a foreign nation, Hartford Fire
has illustrated that the United States is not retreating from its
attachment to broad, pre-accord notions of extraterritoriality.'98
Although the comity rights granted in articles V and VI
theoretically extend to the EU as well as to the United States, the
codification disproportionately benefits the United States. As
discussed above, the EU's endorsement of U.S. notions of
extraterritoriality in Wood Pulp'99 was virtually one-sided .2 00
192 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th
Cir. 1976). For a list of these factors, see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
193 See Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 48, at 20,589-20, 20,613 n.170.
194 See discussion supra Section 2.1.2.
195 See Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 48, at 20,589-12. For the eight
factors as codified in 1995, see supra note 82. Factors seven and eight were
specifically based on concerns expressed in the Agreement. See Enforcement
Guidelines, supra note 48, at 20,589-12 n.74.
196 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
197 See id. at 798.
198 See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
403 cmt. e ("No conflict exists, for these 1urposes, 'where a person subject
to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both.'")). For an
argument claiming that Hartford Fire essentially extends U.S. jurisdiction to
nearly every foreign defendant, negating the need for a comity balance, see
Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: A Postscript
on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 213 (1993).
199 1988 E.C.R. 5193.
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Sir Leon Brittan has indicated that as "the Court [of Justice] has
never rejected the effects doctrine, ... the [European] Commis-
sion remains free to employ it, and ... will do so in future
cases." 2 1 Thus, while the European Commission expressed a
newfound inclination towards U.S. competition jurisprudence, the
ECJ has yet to reveal that its dedication to integration and
territoriality has given way to effects-based extraterritoriality
concerns.
The primary explanation for the ECJ's position is its obliga-
tion to consider the furtherance of Union integration ahead of the
prosecution of foreign defendants. 20 2 For example, Professor
Mauro Cappelletti acknowledges that "it would be naive to expect
the role of European courts in promoting legal integration to be
a replay of the role of their [U.S.] counterparts . . . . European
solutions must above all be sensitive to European traditions."203
Another theory posits that the creation of the Court of First
Instance has accentuated the division between the ECJ and the
European Commission.' 4 The Court of First Instance has more
time to investigate evidence in competition cases, "often to the
[European] [C]ommission's chagrin;" this is a departure from the
past, when the ECJ blindly deferred to Commission decisions.0 5
What began as an ideological debate between the European
Commission and the ECJ, however, may have evolved into an
2" In its opinion, the ECJ only devoted one sentence to its position
regarding the application of international comity:
As regards the argument relating to disregard of international comity,
it suffices to observe that it amounts to calling in question the
Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to conduct
such as that found to exist in this case and that, as such, that argument
has already been rejected.
Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. at 5244. Hardly indicating a commitment to
international comity, this quote merely suggests that the court believes "that
international comity is an issue within the [European] Commission's discretion,
at least in facts similar to Wood Pulp, i.e., the challenged conduct was not
required by foreign law and the remedy does not require the entities to act in
any way contrary to the requirements of their local faws." Griffin, supra note
18, at 358-59 (citation omitted).
'01 Collins, supra note 138, at 249.
202 See discussion supra Section 2.2.2.
203 Pearce, supra note 128, at 577 (quoting Professor Cappelletti) (citation
omitted).
14 See Goldsmith, Market, supra note 168, at 1.
205 Id.
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institutional power struggle.2°'
In light of the Agreement's asymmetric embodiment of U.S.
competition goals, the procedural invalidation in French Republic
v. Commission gains symbolic significance in that it calls attention
to the ECJ's opposition to the European Commission's endorse-
ment of U.S. extraterritoriality principles.07 The United States
has not retreated from its core value of promoting extraterritorial
enforcement of its laws, and the ECJ is not prepared to whole-
heartedly endorse U.S. comity principles. In drafting and
translating the Agreement's terms, the United States might have
mistaken the European Commission's awareness of alternative
policies for the entire EU's endorsement of them. Although the
ECJ must confront the Agreement's comity language, it continues
to speak in a different vernacular than the other enforcement
bodies. Successful reimplementation of the bilateral agreement
should remedy this disparity in interpretation.
5. THE ARGUMENT FOR RESUSCITATING THE BILATERAL
COMPETITION AGREEMENT
As French Republic v. Commission voided the Agreement solely
on procedural grounds, the bilateral pact has been reratified in its
original form in the EU.205 Yet, despite adoption in its initial
form, the Agreement's substance is not immune to attack. EU
membership is rapidly increasing, 9 giving rise to potentially
206 See discussion supra Section 3.2. For example, in his discussion of
jurisdictional issues in EU competition law, Sir Leon Brittan demonstrates
indifference, if not stubbornness, with respect to the ECJ's conpetition policy.
He states that "the Commission as a collegiate body does not have to consult
another department or branch of government to ascertain the likely impact of
a proposed course of action on the [EU]'s external relations. A Commission
decision on competition policy reflects the totality of the Commission's views
and policies." BRITTAN, supra note 91, at 16-17.
207 See discussion supra Section 2.2.2.
20. See Decision of 10 April 1995, supra note 29, at 47; Notice of Other
Recent Documents Not Reproduced in International Legal Materials, May,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 850. After the French Republic's initial attack on the
Agreement, the DOJ and FTC continued negotiations with the European
Commission and in 1995 the European Parliament approved the Agreement as
a precursor to Council review. See WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS S 15.11 (4th ed. 1991 & Supp. 1995).
209 See FOLSOM, supra note 33, at 32-33. The most recent additions and
applicants for Union membership include nations in Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean region. See id.
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diverse, if not conflicting, interests of new Member States who
might join existing dissenters in challenging the Agreement.21°
Similarly, private parties may appeal European Commission
decisions to enforce the comity provisions.2 Sir Leon Brittan
has predicted that the ECJ will eventually "confront the 'hard
case' where it must definitively accept or reject the effects
doctrine. "212 The Agreement's positive and negative comity
provisions, as well as the realities of the modern transactional
world, may inspire the arrival of this hard case.
In particular, the EU's Merger Regulation"' represents a
likely catalyst for a theoretical confrontation between the
Commission and the ECJ. The Merger Regulation provides for
Commission review of concentrations exceeding enumerated
thresholds.2 4  As demonstrated by the Wood Pulp analysis,
"[p]roblems arise over the distinction between the formation of a
contract to merge to which the [ECJ's] implementation theory
applies, and its performance, which is outside the theory."
215
For example, the Commission would assume jurisdiction over an
imminent U.S. merger if both parties previously imported into the
EU because "[t]he merger means that the number of imports is
reduced, and the market more concentrated." 216 By contrast, the
210 See Goldsmith, Accord Is Set Back, supra note 166, at 2 (discussing
France's previous attempts at limiting the Commission's authority to regulate
competition).
211 See Collins, supra note 138, at 273. "With increased enforcement by
private parties or, perhaps more significantly, by national antitrust enforcement
authorities, the Commission will no longer exclusively determine the circum-
stances in which to invoke the effects doctrine." Id. Likewise, "such
agreements cannot resolve the problems arising from private suits in U.S. courts
because the U.S. government cannot legally control private treble-damage
actions." Alford, Application, supra note 21, at 49.
212 Collins, supra note 138, at 249. For example, Sir Brittan claims that if
the parties in Wood PulP had specifically agreed not to fix prices in what was
then the EC market, their conduct would not have been "implemented" within
the EC. See BRITTAN, supra note 91, at 14. Thus, Wood Pulp's implementation
doctrine does not reach the same result as the Commission's comity analysis
with respect to omissions, which are not conduct at all. See id.
213 See Merger Regulation, supra note 96.
214 For a summary of the threshold requirements, see supra note 99.
215 PORTWOOD, supra note 97, at 37.
216 Id.
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ECJ's narrower "implementation theory"217 would not cover
market changes following from such a merger because "the
reduction of two importers to one is [merely] an effect of that
coming together" and lacks "a tenable territorial link."
21
Shortly after the EU adopted the Merger Regulation, Sir Leon
Brittan conveyed his willingness to address competition in world
markets.219 Conceding that the Merger Regulation directs the
Commission to consider the EU market when evaluating the
impact of a concentration, Sir Brittan nonetheless professed that
"[i]f companies in third countries are competing within the [EU],
their market share or other manifestation of competitive pressure
should of course be considered in any assessment of competition
in the [EU] market."20 Speaking for the Commission, he
expressed "no hesitation" to "includ[e] foreign companies in the
analysis of a merger before [him]." 1  Sir Brittan thus appears
to endorse a vigorous EU competition policy as an appropriate
response to the extraterritorial jurisdiction applied by nations such
as the United States.
In reality, "the [ECJ's] territoriality principle cannot endure as
a stand-alone principle as national economies become increasingly
interdependent and as more businesses become multinational. " 'u
In 1991, Sir Leon Brittan anticipated an increase in the number of
"problem cases" as a result of "falling barriers and integration of
markets." '' m
Given the unique disagreement between the Commission and
the ECJ regarding the appropriate view of competition policy, the
Agreement as adopted in 1991 will not prevent the ECJ from
217 For a more complete analysis of the implementation theory as
developed in the Wood Pulp case, see supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
218 PORTWOOD, supra note 97, at 37.
219 See BRrTTAN, supra note 91, at 56.
220 Id.
221 Id.
m Alford, Application, supra note 21, at 41.
223 BRrrTAN, supra note 91, at 18. One example of a globalized market
introducing new and complex competition and regulation issues is the rapidly
expanding telecommunications industry; See, e.g., The Big Picture: Europe Sees
a Slew of Deals Redrawing Lines of Media Power, WALL ST. I. EUR., Aug. 17,
1995, at 1 (discussing the massive increase in internationalmedia mergers);
Kimberley A. Strassel, Convergence: Policy, Regulatory Watch, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Mar. 18, 1996, at 32 (summarizing regulatory developments throughout
Europe in "telecommunications, broadcasting, and related fields").
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obstructing convergent enforcement by misapplying or failing to
apply its provisions. Thus, the ECJ faces two potential options
as it responds to a re-enacted competition Agreement: (1) effective
nullification of the Agreement through the failure to give effect to
the Agreement's substantive provisions, or (2) promotion of the
Agreement's original form with a renewed approach to its
interpretation.
5.1. Suspending the Bilateral Agreement
If the Court rejects the Agreement's substantive terms in the
"hard cases" likely to come before it, the United States and the
EU will essentially revert to their pre-1991 status. The primary
alternative to a bilateral agreement for resuming competition
relations is an international competition agreement. 4  In 1994,
the twelve-member International Antitrust Code Working Group
presented a "draft international antitrust code" at a meeting of the
OECD in Paris. Written in a format suitable for submission
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), 6
the document is intended to integrate anticompetitive conduct on
an international level.2v
224 See Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 833.
, Antitrust Division Official Predicts Scant Prospect of International Code,
11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 220 (Feb. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Scant
Prospect of Code]. Ten months before signing the Agreement, the American Bar
Association's Section of Antitrust Law formed a committee to attack gaps in
the antitrust enforcement policies of "major trading nations." ABA Section
Forms International Committee Aimed at Creating Antitrust Harmonization, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 29 (Tan. 2, 1991) (announcing the December
10, 1990 formation of a group headed by Professors Barry E. Hawk and
Eleanor M. Fox).
2" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The GATT represents the results of
multinational trade negotiations pertaining to the elimination of trade barriers.
See FUGATE, supra note 208, S 13.13. Ninety-nine nations signed the Tokyo
Round of GATT negotiations in 1979 and 117 countries concluded the
Uruguay Round of negotiations, regarded as "the most ambitious trade
liberalization package in history," in 1994. Id. (citation omitted).
," See International Antitrust Code Will Be Studied By GA TT Members, 10
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1470 (Sept. 1, 1993) [hereinafter International
Code Studied]. There are five governing principles for the Code:
[1] the application of substantive national law for the solution of
international cases;
[2] national treatment under national law of nationals and foreigners;
[3] minimum standards for the national laws, agreed upon in an
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The antitrust code proposal would create a governing agency
called the International Antitrust Authority which would be
headed by a president and a twenty-member international antitrust
council.28 The International Antitrust Authority would have
the power to enforce the code's provisions through actions
between either private parties before national courts or contract-
ing nations before an International Antitrust Panel.29
While multinational cooperation has laudable intentions which
are endorsed by the OECD,23' the GATT proposal should not,
and in the near future will not, displace bilateral treaties to
enforce competition policies. 21  The negotiation of multilateral
rules is a time consuming and complex process.3 2  Nations
signing onto the GATT-Multilateral Trade Organization ("MTO")
must concede to international principles that conflict with their
own legislation, rendering passage of certain specific provisions
improbable.233 The alternative to drafting such disputed, partic-
ular terms is drafting general principles as "non-binding sugges-
international agreement;
[4] procedural initiatives to be taken if necessary for the effectiveness
of international antitrust law by an international body or agency, as
well as by parties to the agreement that are adversely affected; and
[5] restriction of these other four principles to cross-border situations.
Id. at 1471.
2 See id. at 1470.
229 See id.
230 See FUGATE, supra note 208, §15.11 (Supp. 1995). Similarly, former
Associate Attorney General James Rill recognized that "[ilt may be useful and
timely to expand upon [the] 'bilateral' model for procedural convergence and
explore antitrust procedural cooprto arents aogthe world's majo~r
indutrialized nations." Rill & Metallo, supra note 153, at 27. For an analysis
strongly advocating competition negotiations in the next round of the GATT,
see Fox, Agenda for the W'TO, supra note 32.
211 See Gary N. Horlick & Michael A. Meyer, The International Conver-
gence of Competition Policy, 29 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L LAW. AND PRAG. 65, 74-75
(1995). Despite Sir Leon Brittan's enthusiasm for a GATT competition
agreement, even he concedes "that the creation of international competition
rules would be a long-term objective." Id. at 75.
232 See Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 84445.
233 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New
Protectionism: The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 393, 427 (1994). Joel Davidow, a Washington, D.C. attorney,
opines that it is "totally unbelievable that the sovereigns are about to give [the]
GATT the power to cut through the sovereign to the enterprise .... [He does
not] think [the] GATT is going to regulate the [antitrust-related] behavior of
companies." Scant Prospect of Code, supra note 225, at 221.
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tions."zs  This approach, however, would render the code
impotent.
Therefore, while the proposed antitrust code may facilitate the
exchange of information and discussion of competition poli-
cies,"5 it should only be regarded as a potential supplement for
bilateral negotiations." 6  Dr. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, the
current Director General for Competition in the European
Commission, regards the Agreement as a useful framework for
subsequent multilateral platforms,237 noting that "eventually,
the possibility of instituting international competition rules and
an international competition authority may be considered as one
of thefinal methods to regulate the increasingly important interna-
tional dimension to each country's economic policy."238 Thus,
global policy discussions are not viable replacements for the
Agreement.
5.2. Resuscitating the Bilateral Agreement with a New Emphasis
Unable to rely on a multilateral competition code to resolve
issues of comity, the United States and the EU should concentrate
on reviving their bilateral contract. Bilateral agreements and
MLATs continue to receive praise for their contribution to
convergent policies. 9 FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky advo-
cates "[b]ilateral information-sharing and enforcement ... [as] the
2 Schoenbaum, supra note 233, at 427.
23 See id.
236 See Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 845 (noting that while a multilateral
agreement may eventually come about, the Agreement provides a framework
for other EU bilateral agreements).
237 See id. If the EU were to reject the comity provisions of the bilateral
Agreement, they might jeopardize "the delicate climate required for bilateral
and, to an even greater extent, multilateral treaties." Pearce, supra note 128, at
525 n.220.
21' Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 845 (emphasis added).
239 For example, on November 2, 1994, President Clinton signed the
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
438, 108 Stat. 4597 (1994), which supports the formation of MLATs by
authorizing the DOJ and the FTC to enter into such agreements. Operating
under OECD recommendations, the agency responsible for a given case
provides antitrust evidence to foreign authorities. See Enforcement Guidelines,
supra note 48, at 20,589-8. See also id. at 20,589-2 (noting that the agencies
referred to in the statute include both the DOJ and FTC).
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first step toward convergence."2'
The joint investigation of Microsoft241 illustrates how conver-
gence can bring about gains in efficiency, consumer benefits, and
a level playing field. AAG Bingaman assessed the close working
relationship between the United States and the EU as clearly
beneficial to "'permit effective competition to emerge in the
market for personal computer operating software and ... [to]
ensure a level playing field to any company that seeks to compete
against Microsoft in the future.' 242 Similarly, the European
Commission viewed the endeavor as "'an important model for the
future, as it shows how the two authorities can combine their
efforts to deal effectively with giant multinational compa-
nies." 243
In the Agreement's second incarnation, the enforcement bodies
should adopt a new emphasis to promote its survival against
substantive attack or weak interpretation by the ECJ. Rather
than myopically focusing on the comity implications of articles V
and VI, the enforcement bodies should give equal attention to
article II (notification), article III (exchanges of information),
article IV (cooperation and coordination of enforcement mecha-
nisms), and article VII (consultation).Y These other articles,
when rigidly enforced, increase the opportunity for enforcement
bodies to become familiar with the mechanics of convergence.24
In addition to changing their focus, the United States and the
EU must learn from past experience. The parties must make a
conscientious effort to increase the number of coordinated
240 Enforcement Officials Stress Need for Continued Foreign Cooperation, 69
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1736, at 524 (Nov. 2, 1995).
241 See discussion supra Section 1.
242 Bingaman Briefs, supra note 17, at 543 (quoting Bingaman's speech to
the 21st Annual Conference of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute). AAG
Bingaman considered "[t]his unprecedented, historic cooperative action" to be
"a powerful message to firms around the world that the antitrust authorities of
the [United States] and the European Commission are prepared to move
decisively and promptly to pool resources to attack conduct by multinational
firms that violate the antitrust laws of the two jurisdictions." Microsoft Settles,
supra note 7, at 106 (quoting a July 16, 1994 news conference).
243 Microsoft Settles, supra note 7, at 107 (quoting an EC statement).
244 See Agreement, supra note 15.
245 See Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 835 (describing the notification clause,
in particular, as a vehicle for facilitating the other provisions).
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enforcement activities under article IV. 46 Although the Agree-
ment was signed in September 1991, the July 1994 Microsoft case
was the first joint investigation and enforcement effort between
the parties. Thus, despite increases in the transnational flow
of information,24' coordinated enforcement remained a dormant
concept for over two years. Limited use of the provisions
translates into limited discourse and impedes progress towards
convergent interests.
Once the United States and the EU gain a greater amount of
practical exposure to each other's policies and goals, they will be
better equipped to handle comity issues. These comity provisions
are not as menacing to the ECJ's tenets as they may seem; they
merely provide an incentive for the EU to add the vigorous
enforcement of competition rules to its existing political agenda.
Commentators predict that the positive comity provision is
unlikely to overwhelm or prejudice a party.249 First, the provi-
sion applies only when challenged conduct infringes upon a host
country's laws °0 Second, "[i]t is not realistic to expect one
government to prosecute its citizens solely for the benefit of
another."25' Finally, positive comity is an ally to any nation
that does not want to engage in negative comity analyses; under
positive comity, the host party is entitled to address the problem
under its own laws. 2
The positive comity provision represents the first formal
recognition of the U.S. right to request that the European
Commission take action to stop anticompetitive activity occurring
"in the [EU] that adversely affects the economic interests of U.S.
businesses or consumers." 3  One commentator has observed
that "in effect, each country attempts to rely on the other
country's local enforcement mechanisms, rather than resorting to
extraterritorial application of its own antitrust law."254 Positive
246 See Agreement, supra note 15, 30 I.L.M. at 1496-97.
247 See Microsoft Settles, supra note 7, at 106-08.
24 See Griffin, supra note 18, at 375.
219 See id. at 377.
25 See id.
25' Id. (citation omitted).
252 See Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 836.
5 Rule, supra note 150, at 1489.
' Deanna Conn, Note, Assessing the Impact of Preferential Trade
Agreements and New Rules of Origin on the Extraterritorial Application of
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comity, therefore, limits the number of instances where the
United States will be required to enter the negative comity thicket
of article VI." Thus, the EU will be in a position to evade
some of the unpalatable comity analyses conducted by U.S. courts
and antitrust enforcers in previous cases." 6  In Laker Airways,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recognized that
"diplomatic and executive channels are, by definition, designed to
exchange, negotiate, and reconcile the problems which accompany
the realization of national interests within the sphere of interna-
tional association. These forums should.., be utilized to avoid
or resolve conflicts caused by contradictory assertions of concur-
rent prescriptive jurisdiction." 27
Increased levels of conversation will also enhance the entire
EU's exposure to the U.S.-influenced negative comity provision,
thereby augmenting the ECJ's sensitivity to extraterritoriality
concerns. In his appeal to the ECJ to endorse the effects test, Sir
Leon Brittan labeled this comity concern a principle of interna-
tional law."8 Furthermore, as decisional law has proven, the
theory of negative comity rarely produces different results than
the theory of union integration in determining whether a court
has extraterritorial jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.259 The
two policies are not always mutually exclusive. One commentator
cleverly demonstrates this assertion by applying the ECJ's "imple-
mentation" test from Wood Pulp to the facts in Alcoa.20" Under
the Wood Pulp test, the Ninth Circuit's assumption of jurisdiction
in Alcoa would persist because in Alcoa, foreign defendants
"implemented" a production quota that restricted imports into the
United States.2 61 Furthermore, negative comity will enhance the
protection of the EU market, since "all undertakings doing
Antitrust Law to International Mergers, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 119, 148 (1993).
25 See Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 836 ("[T]he Agreement gives a
preferred solution under which the [United States] should first ask the EU to
apply EU rules ... rather than applying U.S. law extraterritorially.").
256 See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belg. World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (extending jurisdiction to foreign defendants whose flights
carried a significant number of American passengers).
217 Id. at 955.
" See BRITTAN, supra note 91, at 15.
... See discussion supra Section 2.2.2.
260 See Alford, Application, supra note 21, at 38.
26I See id. at 38-39.
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business within the EEC must respect the rules of competition in
the same way, regardless of their place of establishment."262
Reratification of the original Agreement, with the required
approval of the Council and Parliament, potentially symbolizes a
new policy for the EU as a whole: in the circumstances where
the theories of extraterritoriality and economic unit produce
divergent outcomes, the EU now chooses to endorse the former.
This position does not suggest that the EU has succumbed to U.S.
interests, but rather that the EU is sometimes willing to give
competition a high priority for the international good. Both
parties will benefit from this symbiotic relationship. While
yielding to U.S. notions of comity, the EU can simultaneously
persuade U.S. enforcement bodies to recognize important EU
principles, such as Union solidarity and integration.
Increasing the quantity and quality of bilateral communication
advances the "soft harmonization" of legislative policies.
263 Soft
harmonization of policies is a critical step in taking negotiations
out of the realm of administrative agreements and into the realm
of joint legislation.2 4 Moreover, the cumulation of bilateral
agreements with soft harmonization will promote the ultimate
goal of global convergence.265
6. CONCLUSION
Interactive discourse is critical to the success of the original
draft of the Agreement, ensuring "that differing conceptions of the
antitrust laws are not a barrier to trade." 266  Consequently, the
U.S. antitrust bodies and the European Commission should
promote articles II, III, IV, and VII of the Agreement in order to
reduce the ECJ's difficulties with the comity aspects of articles V
and VI.
The original format of the Agreement, although admittedly
dominated by U.S. philosophies, provides the essential tools for
harmonizing competition policies. When not abused, supplement-
ing negative comity with positive comity can be a powerful force
262 BRITTAN, supra note 91, at 10 (citation omitted).
263 Haagsma, supra note 34, at 242.
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 Schoenbaum, supra note 233, at 436 (discussing the need to consolidate
trade and antitrust policy).
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
for attaining international harmony. Although positive comity is
not a cure-all for avoiding the difficult decisions of negative
comity," it creates the potential for one nation to render
affirmative aid to another-to protect another's capital market and
individual consumers.268 These provisions adhere to pre-1991
recommendations of the OECD and, since 1991, have been
supported by the enforcement bodies of both the United States
and the EU.
269
An international competition policy is not a panacea for the
need of the United States and the EU to speak a common
language of competition;' "[r]enewed efforts are needed to
develop a uniform approach to antitrust law that reflects the
interests and respects the policies of both the EU and the United
States. " "7' The bilateral relationship provides a more specific
and definite format for convergence discourse. Admittedly, the
United States and the EU sit at the negotiating table with two
separate histories of competition. Their policies, however, are not
mutually exclusive. As willing participants in bilateral policy
negotiations, they represent two political entities on the brink of
legislative convergence. Convergence on the bilateral level should
be regarded as a supplement and precursor to the goal of global
harmonization.
The ECJ remains the major barrier to effective implementation
of the Agreement's terms. Rather than treating the Agreement as
a sacrifice of the EU's commitment to integration for the U.S.
doctrine of strict enforcement of antitrust laws, the ECJ should
regard the Agreement as a realistic and immediate opportunity to
strengthen its own competition rules and to share experiences.
267 See id. at 435.
268 Co pare the Agreement's endorsement of international comity
concerns with the philosophy presented by Bill Gates in response to govern-
mental attacks on Microsoft Corporation's monopolistic conduct: "Mr. Gates,
like [Adam] Smith before him, believes that capitalism is the best means to
serve, protect[,] and accommodate the common man. To that end, he feels that
a computer-linked world is the best means to achieve what he calls 'friction-free
capitalism.'" Steven T. Khalil, Microsoft and the 'Invisible Hand', WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 3, 1996, at A8.
269 See discussion supra Section 4.1.
2 See Griffin, supra note 18, at 387 (discussing different governments'
continuing self-preservation through the use of "blocking statutes" despite
converging international competition policy).
271 Id.
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Through discourse, the two bodies will develop convergent
vocabularies, interests, and goals in the spirit of international
economic harmony.
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